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Abstract
We use a field experiment to identify how differences in preferences and autonomy in
decision-making result in sub-optimal adoption of technologies that can maximize the welfare
of all members of the household. We create income-earning opportunities and elicit willingness-
to-pay (WTP) for energy-efficient cookstoves through a real stove purchase experiment with
randomly chosen wives, husbands and couples. Experimental results suggest that women, who
often are responsible for cooking and for collecting fuelwood, reveal a higher preference than
men for the improved stoves. Using an instrumental variables tobit estimator, we show that
women who have higher decision-making autonomy reveal higher WTP than those who have
lower decision-making autonomy. A follow-up survey conducted 15 months after the stove pur-
chase show that autonomy does not affect stove use. Our findings highlight the importance of
considering division of labor, different preferences, and bargaining power differences within the
household when promoting adoption of new household technologies.
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1 Introduction
Household-level decisions made by spouses - who often have different preferences and bargaining
power - have significant implications for the welfare of all members of the household, including
children. There is consistent evidence on the differences in spending patterns - driven by differences
in preference - between men and women in both developed and developing countries, which draws
on observational data. For example, Browning et al. (1994) and Phipps and Burton (1998) in
Canada and Bourguignon et al. (1993) in France document that women have different spending
patterns than men. Women in developing countries spend a larger proportion of their income on
children’s and household goods (Hoddinott and Haddad, 1995), and children’s health (Thomas,
1990), and micro-finance credits have a larger impact on household outcomes when women are the
clients (Pitt and Khandker, 1998). In South Africa, pension income received by women has been
shown to have a larger impact on the health status of children than pension income received by
men (Duflo, 2003). In this paper, we use a novel field experiment to investigate to what extent
differences in preferences, mainly driven by division of labor within the household, and differences
in intra-household decision-making power lead to sub-optimal household decisions.
We created income-earning job opportunities for randomly selected wives, husbands and cou-
ples in the Tigray region of Ethiopia and conducted a real improved stove purchase experiment.
The improved stove we offer, known as the “mirte stove”, reduces fuelwood consumption by 50%,
protects the cook from flames, and reduces smoke and indoor air pollution significantly.1 Conse-
quently, it enhances the welfare of women, who are the default cooks of the household and are
responsible for fuelwood collection, more than for men.2 We use the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak
(BDM) method (Becker et al., 1964) to elicit willingness to pay (WTP) by our subjects. BDM
is an incentive-compatible method of eliciting WTP because subjects make real trade-offs when
they make decisions (Alem and Dugoua, 2017; Hoffman, 2009; Lusk et al., 2001). We refer to the
joint WTP (revealed by the couple) as the “household-level preference” and the individual WTP
revealed by wives and husbands as “wives’ preference” and “husbands’ preference” respectively.
Preferences revealed in this way show to what extent the “household-level” preference resembles
the wives’ or the husbands’ preference. However, individual/joint preferences may still be con-
founded by decision-making autonomy (power) within the household. For example, a wife who
has low decision-making autonomy (power) may reveal a low WTP in the individual decision, not
because she does not want the improved stove, but because she knows that her husband, who is the
default head of the household, will not approve such a purchase. Thus, a low-power wife will very
likely reveal the preference that her husband would normally reveal. In view of this, ignoring the
1See “http://stoves.bioenergylists.org/stovesdoc/Bess/Mirte.htm” for a description of the “mirte” stove.
2In many developing countries, children also benefit from reduced fuelwood collection time and reduced indoor
air pollution (WorldBank, 2011).
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intra-household power relations in a patriarchal society may lead to an incorrect conclusion about
household WTP for the new technology.
Observed bargaining power within the household, which we use as the key variable to explain
WTP, is however likely to be endogenous. Drawing on sociological and anthropological literature
(Dyson and Moore, 1983), and considering the cultural context of the study area, we use two valid
instrumental variables (death of male siblings of the spouses and the spouses’ birth order) to identify
the impact of low intra-household bargaining power by women on their investment decisions. In
patriarchal societies such as rural Ethiopia, a wife with a large number of adult male siblings is
more likely to be protected and respected in her household and community. An exogenous shock
to this variable is highly likely to affect the intra-household bargaining power of the wife within
the household and the community. Moreover, in the context of the study area, a wife who is the
first-born female in her family is likely to receive more assets from her family during her wedding
and, thus, will very likely have more assets under her control. Neither the death of the wife’s
male siblings nor the wife’s birth order affects stove purchase decisions directly except through
decision-making power. These instruments are therefore relevant and exogenous, satisfying the key
requirements of a valid instrument.
Experimental results suggest that wives, who by default are the household cooks and are respon-
sible for fuelwood collection, are willing to pay 60% more than husbands for the improved stove,
and wives who make the decision individually are willing to pay 40% more than those who make
the decision together with their husbands. However, there is no statistically significant difference
between husbands who make the decision individually and those who make the decision jointly
with their wives. Instrumental variables tobit regressions show that wives who have high autonomy
in decisions regarding the purchase of own material items are willing to pay 200% more than are
husbands who are autocratic (i.e., those who do not allow wives to make such decisions). The re-
sults are robust to alternative specifications and definitions of decision-making power. A household
survey conducted 15 months after the stoves were offered shows that decision-making power does
not have any effect on how quickly the stove was put in use. Our results highlight that differences
in preferences, driven by division of labor within the household, and differences in bargaining power
among women and men have significant impacts on the speed of adoption of modern technologies
that improve the welfare of all members of the household.
This paper contributes to a body of research in economics on intra-household decision-making.
Previous studies in developed countries (Browning et al., 1994; Chiappori, 1992; Mazzocco, 2007)
reject the collective model of the household, which assumes that household members achieve Pareto-
efficient outcomes even if they have different preferences and bargain over possible outcomes.3 In a
3Other studies conducted in developed countries (Bourguignon et al., 1993; Browning and Chiappori, 1998; Chi-
appori et al., 2002), however, document evidence consistent with efficiency.
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developing country context, Udry (1996), in Burkina Faso, rejects Pareto efficiency at the household
level by showing that plots managed by women are cultivated much less intensively than similar
plots within the household managed by men, while Robinson (2012), in Kenya, finds risk-sharing in
the household to be Pareto-inefficient. Adding solid evidence to this, more recently, Schaner (2015)
documents that poorly matched spouses in urban Kenya forgo a significant amount of income due
to differences in time preferences, and Alma˚s et al. (2015) show that women in urban Macedonia are
willing to sacrifice household income to gain control over resources. Using both experimental and
instrumental variables estimation strategies, we add solid evidence to this literature by isolating
the impact of preference differences from the impact of bargaining power on household decisions
and efficiency.
The paper also speaks to the literature on technology adoption in developing countries. Modern
technologies, such as improved seed, fertilizer, insecticide-treated bed nets, water purifiers, improved
cookstoves, and solar powered lighting devices significantly improve productivity and welfare of
poor communities, but their adoption and diffusion rates have been sub-optimally low. Some
of the key reasons include uninsured risk (Alem et al., 2010; Dercon and Christiaensen, 2011;
Lamb, 2003), liquidity constraints (Alem et al., 2017; Cohen and Dupas, 2010; Dupas, 2014; Gine´
et al., 2008; Grimm et al., 2017; Tarozzi et al., 2014), behavioral biases (Duflo et al., 2011), and
limited experimentation (Conley and Udry, 2010; Foster and Rosenzweig, 1995). The paper most
closely related to ours, Miller and Mobarak (2013), points out a new reason - gender differences in
preferences within households - to explain the low adoption of improved cookstoves. These authors
offer either a “health-improving” or a “budget-saving” stove at randomly assigned prices to both
women and men in rural Bangladesh. They document that women appear to show a stronger
preference for any improved stove when offered for free, but, when a small price is charged for
either stove, women become less likely than men to adopt, implying their lack of authority to make
a purchase. Our identification strategies allow us to clearly show the impact of preference differences
and the magnitude of the impact of decision-making power within the household on WTP, which
is a continuous measure of adoption. Moreover, our outcome variable of interest - average WTP
by households - is of key importance to policymakers and other stakeholders, who need to estimate
the amount of resources required to speed up adoption in cases where revealed WTP is less than
the cost of production, which appears to be true in our case.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the context, data and ex-
perimental design. Section 3 presents the conceptual framework, which motivates our empirical
strategy. Section 4 describes the variables of interest and the empirical strategy. This section also
presents a thorough motivation of our instrumental variables, which we use to address endogeneity
of autonomy in decision-making. Section 5 presents descriptive results from our experiments, re-
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gression results from an instrumental variables tobit estimator, and key robustness checks. Finally,
Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Context, Data and Experimental Design
2.1 Context
The survey and experiment were conducted in the Tigrai region of Ethiopia. The Tigrai region, in
the North of the country, comprises the three main agro-ecological zones of the country, “Dega”,
“Weynadega” and “Kola”. It is also a region where households have differing access to fuelwood,
some with relatively high access, others with low access. Households in the areas with low access to
fuelwood have to travel on average 30 km/day to collect fuelwood, while those in high-access areas
travel only 6 km/day. Having such a variation in climate and forest conditions provides a favorable
opportunity for the improved stove purchase experiment, because the demand for an improved stove
may vary depending on weather and access to fuelwood.
Improved stoves have been introduced in Ethiopia in general and in the Tigrai region in partic-
ular since the 1980s. Different government and non-government institutions have been involved in
the development and dissemination of several types of biomass cookstove technologies (Gebreegzi-
abher et al., 2006). However, the efforts made by these institutions to disseminate the various types
of improved stoves have not been very successful, partly due to technical problems related to the
stoves themselves (some of the stoves were not really improved or were poor quality) and partly
due to negative perceptions by households (Plan and Finance, 2011). Unlike the old generation of
improved stoves that were used in previous programs, the new stoves, known as “mirte” stoves,
have quality control assurance during the manufacturing process, and use energy more efficiently
with better combustion (Gebreegziabher et al., 2006; Plan and Finance, 2011). Because of its su-
perior technical design, the “mirte” stove reduces fuelwood consumption by 50%, protects the cook
from flames, and reduces smoke and indoor air pollution significantly. However, even with such
improvements in efficiency and quality, the adoption rate of the stove is disappointingly low. For
example, in the Tigrai regional state, take-up of the stove is less than 1% (Plan and Finance, 2011).
2.2 Data collection
Baseline and follow-up surveys were conducted in 12 randomly selected villages (kushets) in the
region representing the major weather and forest conditions. For the baseline survey, a total of 600
sample households were randomly selected from these villages (i.e., 50 households from each village).
A total of 300 households were used for the stove purchase experiment from six villages where the
new generation of improved stove had not been introduced. The remaining 300 households were
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selected from six other villages which also received the improved stove for free. These households
will be used to assess the impact of the stoves in a different study.
We conducted the baseline survey two weeks before the stove purchase experiment and free
distribution of the improved stoves. In these villages, after a short introductions about the study
by village cadres and enumerators, both husbands and wives were asked if they were willing to be
interviewed. If both agreed, the village cadre left and the interview began. Both spouses in all
households were available and volunteered to be interviewed. We conducted the survey with one
village at a time, i.e., all the 15 enumerators we hired interviewed all 50 subjects in most villages,
except in two of the free distribution villages, where 48 and 49 households were interviewed. In the
survey, households were asked about fuelwood collection and use, cooking practices, awareness about
the adverse consequences of cooking with traditional stoves, awareness about improved cookstoves,
household decision-making power, and other socioeconomic variables. About 15 months after the
baseline survey, we conducted a follow-up survey of all households that participated in the baseline
survey. In addition to most of the information collected during the baseline, we collected detailed
information on stove use and experience in the follow-up.
2.3 Experimental Procedure
In the villages where the stove purchase experiment was conducted, 10 representative husbands, 10
representative wives and 30 joint couples from each village were randomly recruited to participate
in the experiment. We informed the subjects that they were randomly selected to come to the
farmers training center on a specified date for two to four hours of compensated physical work
(weeding) and for two more hours to participate in a study. In order to avoid information spread,
pre-experiment spousal influence and self-selection in attending the experiment, no information
was provided about the stove purchase experiment prior to arriving at the farmers training center.
All those randomly selected were willing to come and participate in the physical work and the
experiment. The physical work was introduced to ensure that subjects would buy the improved
stove using income earned from this work. Conducting an experiment with real labor income offers
the advantage of observing the extent to which households can commit to purchase decisions using
income obtained in exchange for labor. This is important because almost all households in the
study area depend on earned income (mainly agricultural income). Our aim was to make the
experiment as realistic as possible and reduce the risk that subjects might treat windfall income
and earned income differently in the decision to buy the stove. This is in line with the theory
of mental accounting, which stipulates that consumers tend to arrange expenditures into separate
mental accounts and how the money is spent depends on how it is acquired (Clingingsmith, 2015;
Hoffman, 2009; Thaler, 1990). These studies document that subjects are likely to share less from
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an earned dollar than from a windfall dollar. Christiaensen and Pan (2012) found that farmers in
China and Tanzania tend to spend earned and unearned income differently, the former on necessity
goods/services and the latter on alcohol and other luxury items. Our subjects made their purchase
decisions using earned income.
In cooperation with the administrators of the farmers training centers, as well as village leaders
and village cadres who were involved in the baseline survey, we organized farmers to arrive at
the place of the experiment at different time schedules. Representative husbands/wives who were
invited to come alone arrived at 8:00 a.m. and representative couples arrived at 10:00 a.m. We had
100% show up on time because, two weeks before the experiment, village leaders and village cadres
reminded the subjects that, if they arrived late, they would be excluded from the list of those who
would participate in the compensated work. Upon arrival, the representative husbands/wives were
told to weed for four hours per person in the center plots and stay for two more hours for the study,
while the representative couples were required to weed for two hours per person and stay for two
more hours for the study. It was required that both partners work for these hours.4 They were
also informed that, at the end of the study, remuneration would be paid in proportion to the time
invested. A representative husband/wife who worked alone for four hours would earn ETB 150
(USD 7.5)5 and a couple who worked together for two hours would also get ETB 150. Subjects
were also informed that it was not possible to choose only one of the two activities (either weeding
or participating in the experiment). No payment would be given if they did not participate in both
activities. All subjects agreed to these terms and participated in both activities.
After completing the weeding task, we gathered all the subjects (50 subjects per village) in
one place and gave them a demonstration of the attributes of the new improved stove. In the
demonstration, the experimenter explained the fuel saving, smoke reduction, time saving, life span
and other attributes of the stove. The same demonstrator was used in all villages to avoid the effect
of the demonstrator. Once the demonstration was done, we divided the subjects into five groups
and placed them in separate places that were far apart. The groups were: a group of representative
wives who were invited alone and would make the stove purchase decision alone using the income
they had earned individually; a group of representative husbands who were invited alone and would
make the stove purchase decision alone using the income they had earned individually; a group of
wives who were invited with their husbands and would make the stove purchase decision alone using
the income the couple had earned; a group of husbands who were invited with their wives and would
make the stove purchase decision alone using the income the couple had earned; and a group of
couples who would make the stove purchase decision jointly using the income the couple had earned.
4Lunch and other refreshments were provided to all subjects and the survey team between the manual work and
the experimental sessions.
5At the time of the experiment, 1 ETB = 0.05 USD.
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Figure 1 presents a summary of the groups and number of subjects in each group. In the groups,
we therefore had subjects who made decisions individually using individually earned income, while
others decided individually using jointly earned income. We introduce this design to investigate
to what extent husbands and wives treat individually earned income and “household” or “joint”
income differently in the purchase decisions. With this approach, we can test the hypothesis in
the intra-household literature that women in developing countries have limited access to household
income to make material purchases for themselves and their children (Kishor and Subaiya, 2008;
Miller and Mobarak, 2013; Orfei, 2012).
Figure 1 about here
In each of these five groups, we asked the subjects to make the purchase decision based on the
Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) random price mechanism. This method has been used in other
contexts, for example to elicit WTP for mosquito bed nets (Hoffman, 2009), for tender beef steak
(Lusk et al., 2001), and for solar lanterns (Alem and Dugoua, 2017). The mechanism works as
follows: participants were asked to bid a price for an improved stove by stating their maximum
willingness to pay. Subjects were given a color copy of currency notes representing actual currency
and an envelope in which to place the maximum amount they were willing to pay for the stove. At
the end, all five groups were gathered in one place and a random price was selected from a bucket
containing the following prices: 30, 45, 60, 75, 90,105, 120, 135 and 150. The prices were unknown
to the participants. Those who bid at or above the randomly drawn price would purchase the
item at the price drawn, and those who bid below the price would not be allowed to purchase the
stove. Under this procedure, it would be in the best interest of the participants to bid according to
their actual valuation of the improved stove. In order to make the information flow consistent, one
experimenter explained the mechanism of the BDM for all groups in all villages. Before the actual
biding for the improved stove, we conducted several practice sessions using pencils until all subjects
understood the game. To make the bids for the stove as confidential as possible, subjects were
placed as far apart as possible; we instructed subjects to keep their bids confidential. If they had
questions, we asked them to raise their hands and the experimenter would give answers privately.
They were told that, at the end, all groups would be gathered in one place and each subject would
pick a random price from a bucket containing the prices set between 30 - 150 ETB.
3 Conceptual Framework
This section develops a framework to model willingness to pay for a household durable, taking
into account differences in preferences and intra-household bargaining power between wives and
husbands, and derives some testable predictions. We follow Anderson and Baland (2002) and
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model a household comprising two members who are involved in decision-making (i.e., spouses),
i ∈ w, h, a wife and a husband. Both members consume a private good c and a household durable
S. There is a difference in preference and consequently in WTP for the household durable (S), the
improved cookstove in this case. In the context of most developing countries and as supported by
the descriptive statistics we present in the next section, improved cookstoves benefit women more
than men because both cooking and fuelwood collection are women’s tasks.
For simplicity, consider a one-period utility maximization problem with two goods. The utility
of the wife is given by
Uw = u(c) + γS, (1)
where c represents household consumption of private goods, u(.) is increasing and concave, and
S = 1 when the household durable is purchased, and zero otherwise.6 The utility of the husband,
on the other hand, is given by
Uh = u(c) + ηS, (2)
where η < γ, i.e., the husband gets a lower level of utility than the wife from the improved
cookstove and, consequently, he is willing to pay less for it.
The purchase decision or WTP is therefore a utility maximization decision subject to budget
constraints. The individual decides whether to pay the retail price (p) if
WTP ≥ p. (3)
Autonomy in decision-making may be confounded in the revealed WTP. Let WTPw and WTPh
be observed willingness to pay of wives and husbands respectively, i.e., WTP revealed during the
experiment. Let WTP ∗w and WTP
∗
h represent the latent levels of willingness to pay that are free
of direct spousal influence. Consider (αw, αh) ∈ [0, 1] to be the wife’s and the husband’s decision-
making power in the household. A value of 0 represents no power and 1 represents full power in
decision making. Thus, (αw + αh) = 1.
A wife who purchases the stove in the absence of her husband might face a punishment Dw
later if the husband does not want to have the stove.7 Suppose the probability of punishment is
given by 1− αw. However, a husband who took part in the stove decision but who decided not to
buy would also face a punishment Dh, given the stove would have benefited the wife. Assume the
6It is plausible to assume that the household durable S provides a flow of services for later periods as well (Besley
et al., 1994). Relaxing the assumption in this way won’t change the predictions of the model.
7The punishments can be expressed in the form of arguments, nagging and yelling. See Ashraf (2009) for punish-
ments couples exercise in a similar setting in rural Philippines.
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probability of punishment by the wife is given by 1−αh. In the absence of spousal influence, wives
and husbands will decide to buy the stove if the net benefits exceed 0, i.e.,
WTP ∗w − p ≥ 0 (4)
and
WTP ∗h − p ≥ 0 (5)
respectively. If the wife’s and the husband’s preferences match, neither of the spouses will face
any punishment even if they have low decision-making power. The probability that the husband
likes (approves) the purchase decision of the wife is given by
φh(WTP ∗h − p ≥ 0) = 1− Φh(p) (6)
where Φh and φh are the cumulative and density probability functions of WTP ∗h respectively,
i.e., the husband’s latent WTP. Consequently, a wife taking part in the stove purchase experiment
will purchase the stove if her expected payoff ≥ 0, i.e.,
E[payoff ]w = [(1−Φh(p))(WTP ∗w−p) + Φh(p)(αw(WTP ∗w−p) + (1−αw)((WTP ∗w−p−Dw)] ≥ 0
(7)
= WTP ∗w − p− (1− αw)Φh(p)Dw ≥ 0 (8)
Using Equations 4 and 8, the revealed WTP of a wife who makes the stove purchase decision in
the absence of her husband is given by
WTPw = WTP
∗
w − (1− αw)Φh(p)Dw (9)
Equation 9 demonstrates that a wife’s revealed and latent WTP will diverge if she has no
autonomy in decision-making. In other words, she will reveal WTP that will very likely be accepted
by her husband, i.e., his WTP.
The husband who makes the stove purchase decision in the absence of his wife may face pun-
ishment, depending on his decision-making power, if he decides not to buy the stove. In this case,
the probability that the wife accepts her husband’s decision not to buy the stove is given by
φw(WTP ∗w − p ≤ 0) = Φw(p) (10)
10
where Φw and φw are the cumulative and density probability functions of WTP ∗w respectively,
i.e., the wife’s latent WTP. The husband will therefore buy the stove if his expected payoff from
the purchase is ≥ 0.
E[payoff ]h = Φ
w(p)[WTP ∗h−p]+(1−Φw(p))[αh(WTP ∗h−p)+(1−αh)(WTP ∗h−p+Dh)] ≥ 0 (11)
= WTP ∗h − p+ (1− αh)(1− Φw(p))Dh ≥ 0 (12)
Using Equations 5 and 12, the husband’s revealed WTP will therefore be given by
WTPh = WTP
∗
h + (1− αh)(1− Φw(p))Dh. (13)
Equation 13 shows that the revealed WTP of the husband is inversely related to his decision-
making power in the household. If the wife has high decision-making power, the husband’s revealed
preference will converge to his wife’s preference. For the spouses who make the stove purchase
decision jointly, the revealed willingness to pay may therefore represent each spouse’s latent WTP
depending on their bargaining power.
4 Empirical Strategy
4.1 Variables
Alternative approaches have been used in the empirical literature to estimate the impact of decision-
making power on various household outcomes. One approach is to use indirect measures of power
from survey data, such as an individual member’s asset ownership, income share, or education, and
link this measure to observed household outcome. In this approach, a woman/man with a higher
share of assets or income in the household is assumed to have greater decision-making power. The
most frequent income and asset types used in the literature are unearned income such as transfers
(Duflo, 2003; Schultz, 1990; Thomas, 1990), inherited assets (Quisumbing, 1994), assets brought
into marriage and current assets (Quisumbing and de la Briere, 2000). The key limitation of this
approach is that it does not directly show how individual preferences affect household decisions,
because individual and household (joint) preferences are not separately observed, i.e., one cannot
tell whether the observed choice of a member is taken at her/his own preference or at the behest
of the other spouse. Moreover, these indirect proxy measures are subject to selection and omitted
variables biases. Some authors, (e.g., Duflo, 2003), have used a quasi-randomized experiment to
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eliminate this bias.
Another survey-based approach is to use a direct measure of power of members and link it with
observed household outcomes. In this regard, couples are asked survey questions about whether they
have the final say about specific or multidimensional household decisions (Allendorf, 2007; Becker
et al., 2006; Chakraborty and De, 2011; Friedberg and Webb, 2006; Mabsout and van Staveren,
2010). In this approach, individual preferences are assumed to be reflected in the observed household
choices where the individual has high decision-making power. This measure may also be subject
to omitted variables biases, but it can be addressed using exogenous instruments, if available. For
example, Chakraborty and De (2011) used distance to natal family as an exogenous instrument
for decision-making power measured in this way. As discussed below, we use this approach in an
instrumental variables framework to address endogeneity of reported decision-making power.
The final approach is to use lab-in-the-field experiments and directly estimate the influence of
household members on joint decisions (Carlsson et al., 2012,1; De Palma et al., 2011; Yang and
Carlsson, 2012). The advantage of this approach is that both individual members’ preferences and
their joint (household-level) decisions are observed. It is therefore possible to directly estimate
the extent to which household (joint) decisions are influenced by individual spouse preferences
(decisions). However, it is difficult to make causal claims on spousal influence captured in this way,
because individual decisions can be confounded by the unobserved decision-making power of the
subjects in the household. Despite this limitation, the approach provides useful insights because it
reveals both individual and joint choices of the same household, which are difficult to elicit using
observational data. Our approach also follows a similar experimental set-up to elicit individual and
joint WTP and their difference. Most recently, Alm˚as et al. (2015) use a novel strategy to identify
decision-making power using a lab-in-the-field experiment, where they elicit WTP by women for
gaining control over household income.
Outcome Variable
We conduct the stove purchase experiment on representative husbands, wives and joint couples
recruited from different households to elicit WTP for the stove, our outcome variable of interest.
As long as these representative husbands, wives and joint couples are selected randomly, we can
consider their revealed WTP to represent the individual and joint preferences, respectively, of the
same household. By comparing individual husband’s and wife’s preferences with the preferences of
couples, we can infer the extent of spousal influence on joint decisions. However, revealed individual
preferences may be confounded by decision-making autonomy (power) in the household. We control
for a direct measure of decision-making power and instrument it with two valid instruments using
an IV tobit estimator to identify its impact. Below, we motivate the instruments and discuss
how the decision-making autonomy variable - our key explanatory variable of interest - has been
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constructed.
Explanatory Variable of Interest and Instruments
Taking the patriarchal nature of the society into account, we use the term “autocratic” if the
husband makes the decision(s) on his own, “moderate” if he makes the decisions with his wife and
“non-autocratic” if he lets his wife decide on her own. Conversely, a wife has “high autonomy” if
she can make the decision on her own, “moderate autonomy” if she makes the decision with her
husband and “low autonomy” if her husband makes the decision.
Our measure of autonomy (or autocracy) is a continuous variable based on the response of
husbands and wives to survey questions about decisions regarding the wife’s personal expenditures
(e.g., purchase of clothes and shoes). For robustness checks, we also ask questions on decisions
regarding the purchase of household durables. For each of these two decision categories, we assign a
value of 1 when the wife reports she has full autonomy to decide (i.e., the husband is non-autocrat),
2 when she reports both make the decision (the husband is moderately autocrat), and 3 when
she reports her husband makes the decision (the husband is autocrat). These two decisions are
important in this particular context for two reasons: the stove is generally a durable household
item, but husbands and wives may treat it as a good that disproportionately benefits the wife.
Taking advantage of the circumstances and cultural norms in the study area, we use birth order
of couples and death of male siblings as exogenous instruments for decision-making power of the
couples. In the study area, land is one of the assets that couples bring to marriage. Couples get land
from their parents and the amount of land brought to the marriage depends on their birth order. A
wife/husband who is first in birth order is more likely to get married earlier and get more land from
the parents than a wife/husband with a later birth order. Upon separation, the husband/wife does
not have a claim on the land because legally it is registered in the name of the wife’s/husband’s
parents. In addition, a wife who is first in birth order is likely to bring more assets into marriage,
as elder siblings are more respected and parents are likely to receive more gifts from friends and
relatives during the wedding. Therefore, a wife who is first in birth order is more likely to have
more assets under her control and hence more decision-making power than a wife with the later
birth order. This instrument is exogenous and is not directly related to stove purchase decisions,
except through decision-making power.
The second instrument, death of male siblings of spouses, is related to the influence of natal
kin on the position of women in the household and community. Drawing on sociological and
anthropological literature (Dyson and Moore, 1983) and consistent with circumstances in the study
area, a wife with more adult male siblings is more likely to be protected, respected and get more
material support than a wife who has more female siblings. A shock to this variable is likely to
directly affect the bargaining power of a wife and indirectly affects her stove purchase decision. A
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test for validity of the instruments can be performed using versions of the Sargan or Basmann test
of overidentifying restrictions (Baum et al., 2016).
4.2 Instrumental Variables Tobit
In the BDM experiment, we ask subjects to bid for the improved cookstove using the money
they earned from the manual work. Because the BDM design is incentive compatible, subjects are
expected to reveal their true preferences through their maximum WTP for the cookstove. However,
their WTP may be bounded by the amount of money they earn from the manual work, which was
set at 150 ETB. Our key empirical model is therefore an instrumental variables tobit model, which
considers the censored nature of the data and takes care of endogeneity of decision-making power
using the two instruments we motivated in the preceding sub-section. The model is specified as
follows:
WTP ∗i = diβ + xiγ + ui (14)
di = xiΠ1 + ziΠ2 + υi (15)
where i = 1, ..., N ;di is a 1 × p vector of endogenous variables (decision-making autonomy or
autocracy in our case); xi is a 1× k1 vector of control variables; zi is a 1× k2 vector of additional
instruments; and the equation for the endogenous variable (equation 15) is expressed in reduced
form. β and γ are vectors of structural parameters, and Π1 and Π2 are matrices of reduced-form
parameters. WTP ∗i is not observable to the researcher; instead the researcher observes
WTPi =

a WTP ∗i < a
WTP ∗i a ≤WTP ∗i ≤ b
b WTP ∗i > b
(16)
For the structural parameters to be identified, k2 ≥ p. It is also assumed that (ui,υi) is a
multivariate normal with covariance matrix
V ar(ui,υi) = Σ =
 σ2u Σ′21
Σ21 Σ22
 (17)
The structural parameters of the model can be estimated using either the maximum likelihood
estimator or Newey’s efficient two-step estimator (Wooldridge, 2010). The maximum likelihood
estimator has been shown to have difficulty in converging, especially if the endogenous variables
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are more than one. The Newey’s two-step estimator, on the other hand, converges easily. In this
paper, we use Newey’s estimator, which is estimated in STATA using the ivtobit command with
the “two-step” option.
5 Results
5.1 Baseline Characteristics
Table 1 presents summary statistics from the baseline survey both at the spouse level and the
household levels. First, means and standard deviations are reported in Columns 1 (Wives) and 2
(Husbands). Column 3 presents statistical tests on mean differences between the two samples. From
Panel A, wives on average are almost 3 years younger, and have less political participation (27%)
and involvement in off-farm work (30%), while about 56% of husbands report political participation,
and 68% are involved in off-farm work. Fuelwood collection seems to be predominantly the wives’
task, with about 82% of wives involving in collection, while only 27% of husbands are involved
in fuelwood collection. From Panel B, we observe that, on average, households spend about 0.44
hours in collecting 1 kg of fuelwood, and spend a total of about 48.8 hours to collect fuelwood every
month. Households in the study area on average collect about 234.4 kg of fuelwood per month.
These descriptive statistics reveal the significant reliance of rural households on biomass fuelwood
and the substantial burden that women in developing countries carry to meet the cooking needs of
the household.
Table 1 about here
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics on decision-making autonomy of wives in purchase of their
own material items. We can see that about 47% of wives perceived themselves as having a low
level of autonomy to make decisions regarding purchases of their own material items. On the other
hand, around 45.5% of husbands consistently perceived their dominance (autocracy) in purchase
decisions of their wife’s material items, i.e., they make the final decision on purchase of their wife’s
material items. Table A.1 in the appendix presents descriptive statistics on autonomy in decision-
making regarding purchase of household durables. These descriptive statistics imply that women
in the study area lack autonomy in decision-making and support the hypothesis that the men
are usually the default heads of households who control the households’ cash accounts. Overall,
the gender-specific summary statistics presented are in line with existing evidence in developing
countries on gender differences (e.g., Anderson and Baland, 2002; Hoddinott and Haddad, 1995;
Miller and Mobarak, 2013; Pitt and Khandker, 1998). Women work more at home and less for wage
income, have low political participation, and lack autonomy regarding major household decisions.
Table 2 about here
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5.2 Experimental Results
Mean WTP by wives, husbands and couples during purchase decisions conducted individually and
jointly are reported in Table 3. Results show that wives who make the purchase decision individ-
ually are generally willing to pay ETB 35.67 (60%) more than husbands who make the decision
individually. This difference is statistically strong, being significant at the one percent level in a
two-sample comparison t-test. Wives who make the stove purchase decision individually are also
willing to pay ETB 27.33 (40%) more than wives who make the decision with their husbands. Hus-
bands who make the purchase decision jointly with their wives are willing to pay ETB 8.33 (14%)
more than husbands who made the decision individually. However, this difference is not statisti-
cally significant at conventional levels. These results highlight both the strong preference difference
between wives and husbands for the improved cookstove and the degree of spousal influence in
household-level decision.
Table 3 about here
We further explore the difference in WTP between wives and husbands by taking into account the
difference in intra-household decision making power of wives. Table 4 presents mean comparison
tests between the sample of wives and husbands depending on wives’ decision-making power on
purchase of their material items. Results in Panel A suggest that wives who have high autonomy
and make the stove purchase decision individually are willing to pay ETB 141.43, while those with
low autonomy and make the stove purchase decision individually are willing to pay only ETB 61.44.
This translates into about 130% more WTP by autonomous wives. WTP for the stove declines by
only 14% when autonomous wives make the stove purchase decision jointly with their husbands.
However, for wives with with low level of autonomy, WTP declines by about 35% when they make
the stove purchase decision jointly with their husbands.
Panel B of Table 4 presents WTP of husbands based on their level of autocracy. Results reveal
that there is no statistically significant difference in WTP between husbands who make the stove
purchase decision individually and those who make the decision jointly. On average, husbands who
are autocratic regarding the purchase of their wife’s material items are willing to pay ETB 45.89,
only around one-third of the full cost of the improved stove (ETB 150) when making the stove
purchase decision individually, while non-autocratic husbands are willing to pay on average ETB
106.67, which translates into 132% more than autocratic husbands. Taken together, the results
provide suggestive evidence on the possible role of women’s decision-making autonomy in adoption
decision of improved household technologies, such as improved cookstoves.
Table 4 about here
Does empowering women improve their decision-making power within the household? In order
to shed light on this question, we let randomly selected wives, husbands and couples work for cash
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to earn money and participate in the stove purchase experiment. We let both wives and husbands
decide on the use of both individually and jointly earned income from the work. Experimental
results for this set of the BDM game are presented in Table 5. Results indicate that wives who are
fully entitled to earnings (they work and earn individually and make the stove purchase decision
individually) are willing to pay 25% more than wives who use household (joint) income from the
experiment. The difference is statistically significant at the one percent level. However, there is
no significant difference in husbands’ willingness to pay between individual and household (joint)
earnings. Husbands do not seem to differentiate between these two income sources. The results
of this part of the experiment have important implications on the role of empowering women in
improving their decision-making power within the household.
Table 5 about here
5.3 Econometric Results
In this section, we investigate the causal relationship between decision-making power within the
household and WTP by wives, husbands and couples using tobit estimators. We begin with the
standard tobit estimator, which treats decision-making power of wives - our key variable of interest
- as exogenous. Regression results are reported in Table 6. Column [1] reports WTP by the wives
sample, Column [2] by the husbands sample, and Column [3] by the pooled sample, in which the
gender of the participant is interacted with decision-making power and with whether the stove
purchase decision was made individually or jointly. In all specifications, we control for individual
characteristics, household characteristics and village fixed effects. Results in Column [1] suggest
that wives’ autonomy in decision-making on purchase of their material items has a strong positive
impact on their willingness to pay for the improved stove. Consistent with the descriptive results
presented in the preceding sub-section, compared to wives who make the stove purchase decision
together with their husbands, wives who make the purchase decision individually are willing to
pay about 20.08 ETB more. Both these effects are statistically significant at the one percent level.
Results in Column [2] indicate how WTP declines with autocracy in household decision-making by
husbands, an effect statistically significant at the one percent level. Results from the pooled sample,
reported in Column [3], also confirm the findings in Columns [1] and [2] that husbands who are
autocratic are willing to pay less (compared to non-autocrat husbands), and husbands who make
the stove purchase decision individually are also willing to pay less (compared to those who make
the decision together with their wives).
Table 6 about here
It is plausible to suspect that the point estimates of our key variable of interest - wives’ decision-
making power - obtained from the standard tobit are biased because of endogeneity. Omitted
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variables bias due to measurement error and/or due to unobserved individual heterogeneity, such
as spouses’ ability to persuade each other, are likely to contribute to endogeneity of the power
variable. In order to address this, we estimated instrumental variables tobit regressions using birth
order of the spouses and death of male siblings as instruments. The first-stage relationships between
the two instruments and the decision-making power reported in Table 7 are strongly negative: birth
order and death of male siblings are both significantly related to decision-making power at the 99
percent confidence level, conforming their relevance. We further conduct a weak instruments test
for such types of models following Finlay and Magnusson (2009) and reject the null hypothesis of
weak instruments. This relationship is robust to the inclusion of controls and village fixed effects.
Wives who were born first (earlier) are likely to be autonomous, while those who experienced death
of male siblings after their marriage are likely to have less autonomy in decision-making. These
results clearly indicate that the two instruments are relevant. We test exogeneity of the instruments
using the versions of the Sargan or Basmann test of overidentifying restrictions test, the Amemiya-
Lee-Newey overidentification test, which tests for the null hypothesis that the excluded instruments
are valid. A rejection of the null casts doubt on the validity of the instruments. The null hypothesis
of exogeneity is not rejected in all regressions, implying that our instruments are exogenous.
Table 7 about here
The second-stage of the IV tobit equation estimates the impact of decision-making power on
willingness to pay for the improved cookstoves. The results are presented in Table 8, Columns
[1]- [3], for the wives, husbands and the pooled samples. Autonomy in decision making by wives
strongly increases their WTP for the improved cookstoves and the effect is significant at the 99%
confidence interval. The coefficient on the power variable for wives increased from 33.12 ETB in the
standard tobit regression to 40.25 in the IV tobit. This is equivalent to about a 21.5% increase in
the coefficient, providing strong evidence for the importance of addressing endogeneity of decision-
making power. The coefficients of the variables indicating individual decision and decision using
income earned individually by wives also increase after controlling for endogeneity of decision-
making power, although the changes are not as large as coefficient on decision-making power.
Results in Column [2], on the other hand, confirm that WTP by husbands declined further after
controlling for endogeneity of decision-making power.
Table 8 about here
5.4 Robustness Checks
We investigate robustness of our results using alternative definitions of intra-household bargaining
power and regressions. First, we re-construct the decision-making power (autonomy/autocracy)
variable using the response to the question regarding decision making on purchase of household
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durables. Following the definition of the power variable in decision-making on the wife’s material
items, we construct the power variable in decision-making on household durables as a continuous
variable, where 3 stands for complete autocracy by husbands and 1 for non-autocracy (i.e., the wife
autonomously makes the decision). Table A.1 in the appendix shows that 49.5% of wives lack the
autonomy to decide on household durables and only 26% feel that they have complete autonomy
to make such decisions. These descriptive statistics are quite similar to the descriptive statistics on
autonomy of wives in purchase of their own material items presented in Table 2.
We then investigate WTP for improved stoves based on the level of decision- making power
on purchase of household durables. Mean WTP comparison results presented in Table A.2 (Panel
A) in the appendix suggest that wives who have high autonomy and make the stove purchase
decision individually are willing to pay more than twice what autocratic husbands who make the
stove purchase decision individually (Panel B) are willing to pay. The results in the joint purchase
decision of improved stoves are also similar to the ones we found using wives’ decision-making
power on purchase of own material items. Wives who have more autonomy in decision-making for
household durables are significantly willing to pay more than wives who lack autonomy.
Second, we re-estimate both the standard tobit and the instrumental variables tobit regressions
using decision making autonomy for household durables. Tables A.3, A.4 and A.5 in the appendix
present results from the standard tobit, IV tobit first-stage, and IV tobit main results respectively.
The results are consistent with the ones we documented in the preceding section: wives who are
autonomous in making decisions regarding purchase of household durables are willing to pay much
more than husbands who are autocratic, and wives who make the stove purchase decision individ-
ually are willing to pay more than those who make the stove purchase decision together with their
husbands.
Finally, we investigate whether decision-making power determines how quickly the improved
stove is put in use. We conducted a follow-up survey on both groups of households, i.e., those
who participated in the stove purchase experiment and those who received the cookstoves for
free 15 months after the stoves were adopted. We collected detailed information on stove use,
fuelwood collection, fuelwood consumption and time allocation. Table A.6 in the appendix reports
instrumental variables linear (two-stage least square) regression results on the correlates of stove
use measured by the number of months since the stove was in use. Results suggest that decision-
making power does not have any impact on how quickly the stove is put to use once the household
acquires the stove. This supports our hypothesis that decision-making power, rather than inability
to understand the stove’s benefits, is the most important factor that hinders wives from purchasing
the stove. Table A.6 also provides other useful insights on the correlates of the improved stove use.
Column [3] shows that educated wives, those who participate in off-farm employment opportunities,
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those who have more male adult household members, and children are very likely to use the stove
for a longer period. Richer households, on the other hand, appear to use the stove for a shorter
period of time.
6 Conclusions
This paper uses a field experiment to analyze the effects of differences in preferences and intra-
household decision-making power on willingness to pay for a new household durable. The exper-
iment was conducted using representative wives, husbands and couples from the Tigray region of
Ethiopia. We invited randomly recruited subjects to participate in a public works project in order
to earn income, which they were given the option to spend on the purchase of improved cookstoves.
The stoves are a new generation of improved stoves called the “mirte stove” and have been proven
to reduce fuel consumption by 50% and indoor air pollution by about 90%. Thus, they have a
large potential for improving the wellbeing of all members of the household, but most importantly
that of women and children. Motivated by the literature in sociology and anthropology, we use
two exogenous instruments - birth order of the subjects and death of male siblings - to address
endogeneity of decision-making power. A wife/husband who is first in birth order is more likely to
get married earlier and get more land from parents than a wife/husband with a later birth order,
which in turn improves their bargaining position in the household. Similarly, a wife with more adult
male siblings is more likely to be protected, respected and get material support than a wife who
has more female siblings (Dyson and Moore, 1983). A shock to this variable is likely to directly
affect the power of a wife and indirectly affect a wife’s stove purchase decision. Neither of these
instruments are expected to directly affect willingness to pay (WTP) for improved stove, satisfying
the validity requirement of a credible instrument. Our experimental design and empirical strategy
therefore allow us to tease out the role of both preference difference and decision-making power
between women and men within the household, which is the key contribution of our paper.
We find strong evidence that difference in both preferences and intra-household bargaining power
drive WTP for the improved cookstove. Wives who make the stove purchase decision individually
in general are willing to pay 60% more for the improved stove than husbands. Wives who make
the decision individually are willing to pay 40% more than those who make the decision together
with their husbands. We don’t find a statistically significant difference between husbands who make
the decision individually and jointly. Wives who have high autonomy in decisions regarding the
purchase of their own material items are willing to pay more than twice that of husbands who
are autocratic (one who does not allow his wife to decide on purchase of her own material items).
A follow-up survey conducted 15 months after the stoves were offered shows that decision-making
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power does not have any impact on how quickly the improved stove is put to use. This supports our
hypothesis that, if wives do not purchase the stove, it is because of lack of autonomy rather than
lack of interest in the stove. Our results remain robust to alternative definitions of decision-making
power and alternative specifications.
The results here suggest that preference differences, mainly driven by division of labor in the
household and women’s lack of decision-making power have significant impacts on investment deci-
sions on household durables that benefit all members of the household. Our results are consistent
with previous studies (Anderson and Baland, 2002; Miller and Mobarak, 2013; Schaner, 2015) con-
ducted in different set-ups and show that preference differences by couples lead to sub-optimal
household decisions. Our results have policy implications that extend to many other technologies
that can provide benefit to the entire household and improve welfare in poor communities. Very
often, policymakers and other stakeholders, such as NGOs, face constraints on how to optimally
distribute modern technologies. Our findings indicate that adoption can be increased significantly
if the existing differences in division of labor and decision-making power within the household are
taken into consideration. While empowering women is a long-term and relatively complex develop-
ment outcome, the results suggest that simple and easy-to-design job opportunities, which entitle
women to their own earnings, improve their decision-making power and benefit other household
members, such as children.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics at Baseline
[Wives] [Husbands] [Mean Diff.]
Mean SD Mean SD Diff. SE
Panel A:Individual Characteristics
Age 45.16 12.96 48.14 13.41 -2.98** 1.39
Years of schooling 1.61 1.68 1.34 2.19 0.27 0.21
Member of the ruling party 0.27 0.45 0.56 0.50 -0.28*** 0.05
Participates in fuelwood collection 0.82 0.38 0.27 0.45 0.55*** 0.04
Time spent on fuelwood collection/month (in hours) 32.50 27.88 1.48 2.97 31.03*** 2.09
Participates in off-farm income activities 0.30 0.46 0.68 0.47 -0.38*** 0.05
Number of male siblings died 0.44 0.76 0.44 0.85 0.01 0.08
Birth order 2.64 1.61 2.18 1.43 0.46** 0.16
Participants in indiv. stove purchase decision 120 120
Participants in joint stove purchase decision 60 60 60
Participants in indiv. stove purchase decision - indiv. income. 60 60 60
Participants in indiv. stove purchase decision - joint income 60 60 60
Observations 180 180 360
Panel B: Household Characteristics
Mean hours spent in collecting 1 Kg of fuelwood (shadow price) 0.44 0.43
Household monthly time spent in fuelwood collection (in hours) 48.81 41.73
Household monthly fuelwood collection (in kg) 234.40 181.78
Household livestock ownership (TLU) 4.93 4.12
Household wealth in 1000 ETB 34.96 39.26
Household land size (in Timad) 3.05 2.21
Number of trees the household owns 12.04 33.47
Number of adult males (age >15) 0.63 0.98
Number of adult female (age >15) 0.64 0.97
Number of male youth (age 7-15) 0.69 0.97
Number of female youth (age 7-15) 0.94 1.10
Number of children (age < 7) 0.86 0.99
Household size 5.76 1.77
Number of windows in the house 0.53 0.72
Owns a separate kitchen (1=yes, 0=no) 0.51 0.50
Observations 360
Notes: ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
Table 2: Decision-making autonomy (autocracy)
Panel A: Wives
Wives’ autonomy in purchase of own material items Freq. Percent
Low level of autonomy 85 47.22
Moderate level of autonomy 45 25.00
High level of autonomy 50 27.78
Total 180 100.00
Panel B: Husbands
Husbands’ autocracy in purchase wives’ material items
High dominance (autocrat) 82 45.56
Moderate 62 34.44
Low dominance (non-autocrat) 36 20.00
Total 180 100.00
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Fig 1: Diagram of Experimental Design		
Husbands,	Wives	and	Couples	 Joint	Decision	120	couples	(120	husbands	and	120	wives)		Individual	Decision	Husband	makes	decision	(120	husbands)		Wife	makes	decision	(120	wives)	 Jointly	earned	income	(120	couples)	
Decision	on	income	earned	by	the	wife	(60	wives)		
Decision	on	income	earned	together	with	husband	(60	wives)		
Decision	on	income	earned	together	with	wife	(60	husbands)		
Decision	on	income	earned	by	husband	(60	husbands)		
Table 3: WTP: wives, husbands, and couples in individual and joint decisions
[1] [2] [3]
[Wives] [Husbands] [Mean Diff.]
Decision type Mean SD(SE) Mean SD(SE) Mean (SE)
Individual decision 96.17 40.72 60.5 34.77 35.67*** (4.89)
Joint decision 68.83 43.66 68.83 43.66
Mean difference 27.33*** (6.59) -8.33 (6.00)
Observations 180 180 360
Notes: ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
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Table 4: Autonomy (autocracy) in decision-making and WTP by wives and husbands
[1] [2] [3]
[Indiv.] [Joint] [Diff.]
Mean SD(SE) Mean SD(SE) Diff, SD(SE)
Panel A: Wives
Low level of autonomy 61.44 20.24 40.00 10.68 21.44*** (4.21)
Moderate level of autonomy 114.04 23.83 66.32 40.03 47.72*** (9.55)
High level of autonomy 141.43 15.56 122.00 34.48 19.43** (7.02)
Mean diff: low and high autonomy -79.99*** (3.98) -82.00*** (7.25)
Mean diff: low and moderate autonomy -52.60*** (5.03) -26.32** (8.19)
Mean diff: moderate and high autonomy -27.39*** (5.04) -55.68*** (13.02)
Observations
Panel B: Husbands
Non-autocrat 106.67 23.73 122 34.48 -15.33 9.68
Moderate 56.98 32.39 66.32 40.03 -9.33 9.60
Autocrat 45.89 23.86 40.00 10.68 5.89 4.90
Mean diff: non-autocrat and autocrat 60.77*** (6.1) 82*** (7.25)
Mean diff: non-autocrat and moderate 49.69*** (7.95) 55.68*** (13.02)
Mean diff: moderate and autocrat 11.08* (5.65) 26.32*** (8.19)
Observations
Notes: ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
Table 5: Mean WTP of wives and husbands using individual or joint income
[1] [2] [3]
[Wives] [Husbands] [Mean Diff.]
Income type Mean SD(SE) Mean SD(SE) Mean SD
Individual earning 100.42** 38.38 59.25 35.62 41.17*** (6.76)
Joint earning 80.38 44.60 65.29 39.20 15.08** (5.42)
Mean Difference 20.04** (6.74) 6.04 (6.02)
Observations 180 180 360
Notes: ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
Table 6: The impact of decision-making power on WTP: Tobit results
[1] [2] [3]
[Wives] [Husbands] [Pooled]
Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE
Power 33.120*** 2.452 -28.244*** 3.060 33.898*** 2.432
Individual decision 20.083*** 3.812 -4.376 4.550 19.814*** 4.274
Earned individually 10.902*** 4.016 -1.986 4.524 10.104** 4.423
Husband -4.939 5.608
Power*Husband -62.301*** 3.625
Individual*Husband -25.107*** 5.985
Joint*Husband -11.295* 6.086
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Village fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 180 180 360
Notes: ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
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Table 7: The impact of decision-making power on WTP: IV Tobit results - First Stage Regressions
[1] [2] [3]
[Wives] [Husbands] [Pooled]
Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE
Birth order -0.103*** 0.032 -0.143*** 0.034 -0.141*** 0.026
Death of male siblings -0.216*** 0.070 -0.132** 0.058 -0.281*** 0.049
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Village fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Test of overidentifying restrictions (p-values) 0.79 0.13 0.34
Observations 180 180 360
Notes: ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
Table 8: The impact of decision-making power on WTP: Instrumental Variables Tobit results
[1] [2] [3]
[Wives] [Husbands] [Pooled]
Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE
Power 40.250*** 7.582 -36.059*** 8.669 40.991*** 8.155
Individual decision 21.016*** 4.032 -3.672 4.673 20.352*** 4.366
Earned individually 12.087*** 4.298 -2.171 4.596 10.787** 4.539
Husband -6.050 5.807
Power*Husband -70.201*** 9.407
Individual*Husband -25.464*** 6.072
Joint*Husband -12.060* 6.218
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Village fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 180 180 360
Notes: ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
Table A.1: Decision-making autonomy (autocracy)
Panel A: Wives
Wives’ autonomy in purchase durables Freq. Percent
Low level of autonomy 89 49.45
Moderate level of autonomy 44 24.44
High level of autonomy 47 26.11
Total 180 100.00
Panel B: Husbands
Husbands’ autocracy in purchase of durables
High dominance (autocrat) 91 50.56
Moderate 52 28.89
Low dominance (non-autocrat) 37 20.55
Total 180 100.00
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Table A.2: Autonomy (autocracy) in decision-making and WTP by wives and husbands
[1] [2] [3]
[Indiv.] [Joint] [Diff.]
Mean SD(SE) Mean SD(SE) Diff, SD(SE)
Panel A: Wives
Low level of autonomy 66.83 28.61 40.00 10.68 26.83*** (5.79)
Moderate level of autonomy 115.96 25.30 63.89 39.73 52.07*** (9.79)
High level of autonomy 139.19 17.08 121.25 33.44 17.94** (7.33)
Mean diff: low and high autonomy -72.37*** (5.58) -81.25*** (7.04)
Mean diff: low and moderate autonomy -49.14*** (6.46) -23.89*** (8.15)
Mean diff: moderate and high autonomy -23.23*** (5.64) -57.36*** (12.68)
Observations 120 60 180
Panel B: Husbands
Non-autocrat 107.87 24.83 121.25 33.44 -13.87 (9.57)
Moderate 53.09 29.49 63.88 39.73 10.80 (9.71)
Autocrat 49.23 26.97 40.00 10.68 9.23* (5.47)
Mean diff: non-autocrat and autocrat 58.15*** (6.65) 81.25*** (7.04)
Mean diff: non-autocrat and moderate 54.29*** (7.22) 57.36*** (12.68)
Mean diff: moderate and autocrat 3.86 (5.9) 23.89** (8.15)
Observations 120 60 180
Notes: ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
Table A.3: The impact of decision-making power in purchase of durables on WTP: Tobit results
[1] [2] [3] [4]
[Wives] [Husbands] [Pooled] [Mar. Eff.]
Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE
Power in purchase of durables 29.161*** 2.567 -26.437*** 2.834 25.641*** 2.437
Individual decision 20.865*** 4.173 -1.703 4.566 20.461*** 4.666
Earned individually 11.058** 4.370 -2.797 4.517 9.852** 4.789
Husbands -2.691 6.112
Power*Husbands -52.067*** 3.706
Individual*Husbands -29.178*** 6.551
Joint*Husbands -9.809 6.608
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Village fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 180 180 360
Notes: ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
Table A.4: The impact of decision-making power in purchase durables on WTP: IV Tobit results -
First Stage Regressions
[1] [2] [3]
[Wives] [Husbands] [Pooled]
Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE
Birth order -0.109*** 0.033 -0.139*** 0.037 -0.137*** 0.027
Noumber of male siblings died -0.192** 0.074 -0.165*** 0.063 -0.268*** 0.051
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Village fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 180 180 360
Notes: ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
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Table A.5: The impact of decision-making power in purchase durables on WTP: IV Tobit results
[1] [2] [3]
[Wives] [Husbands] [Pooled]
Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE
Power in purchase of durables 40.844*** 8.754 -32.816*** 8.215 41.667*** 9.627
Individual decision 22.931*** 4.701 -0.425 4.832 22.525*** 5.114
Earned individually 13.531*** 4.993 -3.166 4.564 12.254** 5.285
Husband -4.660 6.615
Power*Husband -69.186*** 10.666
Individual*Husband -32.714*** 7.280
Joint*Husband -11.693 7.129
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Village fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 180 180 360
Notes: ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
Table A.6: Decision-making Power and Stove Use: 2SLS results
[1] [2] [3]
[BDM Villages] [Free Dist. Villages] [All Villages]
Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE
Autonomy in purchase of wife’s material items 0.108 0.998 0.709 1.394 -0.665 0.866
Age 0.002 0.025 -0.004 0.018 -0.015 0.015
Proportion of time wife allocates for fuelwood collection -1.004 0.799 2.786*** 0.710 0.929* 0.533
Number of livestock in tropical livestock units -0.012 0.060 -0.329*** 0.059 -0.217*** 0.042
Wife’s years of schooling 0.822*** 0.189 0.209** 0.092 0.480*** 0.099
Wife participates in off-farm work (1=yes, 0=no) 0.612 0.726 2.353*** 0.451 2.198*** 0.417
Number of adulte males in teh household 0.424 0.314 1.340*** 0.266 1.210*** 0.207
Number of male youth in the household 0.163 0.332 0.035 0.230 0.038 0.212
Number of adult females in the household -0.171 0.334 0.484** 0.217 0.176 0.211
Number of female youth in the household -0.498 0.311 0.278 0.209 -0.063 0.194
Number of children in the household 0.965*** 0.354 0.385* 0.218 0.739*** 0.219
Number of windows 0.134 0.436 -0.662*** 0.252 -0.750*** 0.258
Separate kitchen -0.050 0.578 -0.154 0.387 -0.315 0.368
Wealth (value/1000) 0.014* 0.007 -0.001 0.005 0.007 0.005
Household land size -0.233 0.155 0.058 0.079 0.055 0.081
Number of trees 0.065 0.214 0.044 0.150 0.052 0.137
Intercept 3.385** 1.667 1.334 1.327 2.310** 1.148
Village fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 300 296 596
R-squared 0.21 0.62 0.31
Notes: ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
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